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ABSTRACT 
  The U.S. retail grocery industry shifted from an industry dominated by small 
grocers serving local markets to one characterized by large retailers present in 
international markets. Average retail grocery concentration as measured by CR4 
increased from 17.8 in 1982 to 43.0 in 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1982; Trade 
Dimensions Marketing Guidebook, 2000).  Wal-Mart’s tremendous growth is the catalyst 
to this change.  Although Wal-Mart has been studied from multiple perspectives, little is 
known about Wal-Mart’s effect on market concentration.  Understanding Wal-Mart’s 
influence on market concentration is important because an extensive literature shows a 
pattern linking retail grocery market concentration to increases in retail grocery prices.   
The objective of this analysis is to evaluate the effects of de novo entry by Wal-
Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concentration (CR4).  Using a panel dataset complied 
from Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook and Market Scope publications, the effect 
of Wal-Mart Supercenters on changes in retail grocery concentration was estimated.  The 
results show that existing Wal-Mart Supercenter operations and entry by Wal-Mart 
Supercenters significantly increase the rate of change in retail grocery concentration as 
measured by CR4. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During  the  past  two  decades,  the  U.S.  retail  grocery  industry  has  seen  a 
contraction of small “Mom and Pop” retailers,
1 mergers and acquisitions among large 
retailers, and the emergence of a new, large supercenters stores (Wal-Mart, Target, K-
                                                       
1 The number of small supermarkets decreased by 15.5 percent from 1999 to 2002 (U.S. Bureau of Census, 2005).   3 
Mart) (Kaufman, 2002).  In addition, average retail grocery concentration as measured by 
CR4 increased from 17.8 in 1982 to 43.0 in 1999 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1982; Trade 
Dimensions Marketing Guidebook, 2000).
2  Grocery shifted from an industry dominated 
by small grocers serving local markets to one characterized by large retailers present in 
international  markets.    The  growth  of  Wal-Mart  Supercenters  is  explained  by  many 
factors,  including  supply  chain  management  and  logistics  strategies  which  drastically 
lower costs compared with traditional grocers, fewer weekly trips to supermarkets by 
consumers,  and  evolving  store  formats.    These  larger  retailers  enjoy  a  lower  cost 
structure, combined with expertise in marketing, store design, and shelf space allocations.   
Concerns  have  arisen  that  large  grocers  are  using  these  advantages  to  reduce 
consumer access to local groceries (Blanchard and Lyson, 2002), increase retailer market 
power (Foer, 1999), and discourage competition (FTC Report, 2001).  Wal-Mart is often 
at the heart of the media’s reporting of the grocery industry’s changes, due in part to its 
rapid growth and size.
3   
Wal-Mart’s tremendous growth is the catalyst to this change.  In 1987 Wal-Mart 
did not sell a full line of groceries.  By 2002, the company surpassed Kroger Foods to 
become the largest retail grocer in the United States.  This rapid growth is expected to 
continue, with one prediction that Wal-Mart will control 35 percent of the U.S. retail 
grocery sales for many consumer products by 2010 (Clarke, 2005).  Although Wal-Mart 
has been studied from multiple perspectives, little is known about Wal-Mart’s effect on 
                                                       
2 CR4 is the market share of the top 4 retail grocery firms.  CR4 in the grocery marketing areas (GMAs) used in this 
study increased 6 points from 1999 to 2002, from 59.8 to 65.8 (Trade Dimensions, 1999-2000 and 2002-2003). 
3 A few of the hundreds of newspaper articles, radio commentaries, television documentaries, and news stories include 
National Public Radio’s series “Is Wal-Mart Good for America?” (Smith, 2004), The Los Angeles Times’ Pulitzer 
Prize winning series of articles on Wal-Mart (Cleeland and Goldman, 2003), and The Economist’s “How Big Can It 
Grow” article (2004).  These reports, although often based on inferential analysis and anecdotes, identify important 
changes occurring in the grocery industry.   4 
market concentration.  Understanding Wal-Mart’s influence on market concentration is 
important because an extensive literature shows a pattern linking retail grocery market 
concentration to increases in retail grocery prices.   
Yu  and  Connor  (2002)  note  that  only  the  banking  and  airline  industries  have 
received more empirical price-concentration analysis than the retail grocery industry.  Of 
the many published price-concentration studies in the grocery industry (Marion et al., 
1979; Lamm, 1981; Cotterill, 1986; Kaufman and Handy, 1989; Weiss, 1989; Anderson, 
1990; Newmark, 1990; Cotterill and Harper, 1995; Binkley and Connor, 1998; Cotterill, 
1999), only two (Kaufman and Handy, 1989 and Newmark, 1990) did not find a positive 
relationship between market concentration and price.  Moreover, the findings in both of 
those studies have been refuted by Cotterill (1993) and Yu and Connor (2002).  Since 
high concentration levels increase retail grocery prices, understanding the determinants of 
retail grocery concentration is important.   
Contrary to the findings of traditional retail grocery concentration-price literature, 
Wal-Mart entry is associated with reduced retail grocery prices, not increasing prices.  
There has been research evaluating whether efficiency gains associated with large stores 
offset the higher mark-ups resulting from increased market concentration in the retail 
grocery industry.  Dobson and Waterson (1997) found that higher mark-ups are offset by 
discounts arising from greater efficiency.  They conclude that the effects from changes in 
market structure depend on the relationship between market power and scale economies.  
Aalto-Setala (2002) evaluated increasing returns, concentration, and market power in the 
Finnish retail grocery industry.  “There is no need to constrain directly the growth of 
larger  stores  (in  Finland)  from  an  anti-trust  perspective  as  long  as  there  is  sufficient   5 
competition”  (Aalto-Setala,  2002).    Therefore,  although  cost  efficiencies  from  scale 
economies appear to off-set at least part of the mark-up resulting from increased market 
concentration, competition remains important.     
In  the  US,  the  Robinson-Patman  Act,  which  is  concerned  with  large  buyers 
harming  smaller  buyers  by  eliciting  large  discounts  from  suppliers,  adds  to  the 
importance of understanding market concentration in the grocery industry.  The reality of 
or even the consideration of enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act began in 1999 
when the American Antitrust Agency (AAI) and Wakefern Food Corporation petitioned 
the  Federal  Trade  Commission  to  recognize  that  retail  grocery  concentration  is  high 
enough to trigger the use of the Robinson-Patman Act.  As of 2006, the Robinson-Patman 
Act has not been used to discourage modern retail concentration levels. 
Understanding  the  primary  causes  of  retail  grocery  market  concentration  is 
important  because  of  the  strong  relationship  between  concentration  and  price.    The 
popular media often blames Wal-Mart for putting small grocery retailers out of business, 
but  a  literature  review  found  no  studies  that  clearly  link  Wal-Mart  and  market 
concentration.  Therefore, the objective of this analysis is to evaluate the effects of de 
novo entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters on retail grocery concentration (CR4). 
This  work  is  unique  because  it  is  the  first  known  study  to  evaluate  the 
determinants of changes in market concentration in the retail grocery industry, although 
such studies are rather common in the manufacturing sectors.  One key aspect of a retail 
grocery  concentration  study  that  differs  from  a  manufacturing  concentration  study  is 
market scope or geographical market size.  While the retail grocery market concentration 
for the entire US may not be considered high, local markets are typically much more   6 
concentrated.    “Local  market  concentration  measures  the  ability  of  supermarkets  to 
exercise market power and raise retail price” (Cotterill, 1999).
4       
LITERATURE 
Relevant literature includes theory from location literature and empirical works 
from the market concentration and retail grocery industry literature.
5  First, the only study 
found in a literature search evaluating Wal-Mart’s effects on retail grocery concentration 
will  be  discussed.    Franklin  (2001)  evaluated  Wal-Mart’s  effects  on  supermarket 
concentration by examining the largest 100 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) using 
Trade Dimension’s Market Scope data.   
Franklin’s first step was to discuss descriptive statistics based the Market Scope 
data.    From  the  descriptive  statistics,  Franklin concluded  that  “Wal-Mart  Supercenter 
entry  had  little  impact  on  food  seller  concentration  in  19  major  metropolitan  areas 
between 1993 and 1998.”  In addition, Franklin concluded that Wal-Mart entry into a 
MSA  initially  results  in  a  decrease  in  CR4  followed  either  by  competitor  retaliation 
(increasing  concentration),  an  exodus  of  fringe  firms  (increasing  concentration),  or 
nothing (decreasing concentration).   
Then  Franklin  estimated  univariate  and  multivariate  econometric  models  to 
determine whether Wal-Mart entry and market share are related to median household 
income,  metropolitan  size  as  measured  by  total  population,  or  time  since  Wal-Mart 
entered a MSA.  Both a univariate and a multivariate logit model suggested a negative 
                                                       
4 Cotterill went on to discuss how four firm concentration levels (CR4) changed from 1992 to 1998. In California, CR4 
increased from 50.1 to 69.8 percent, while in Florida the local CR4 levels increased from 77.7 to 87.7 percent.  
Cotterill attributes much of this increase in concentration to mergers and acquisitions by large grocery retailers. 
5 The market concentration studies primarily relate to the manufacturing sectors.  Therefore, those sectors will be 
reviewed, noting that not all aspects of the studies will be related to retail concentration.   7 
relationship  between  median  household  income  and  Wal-Mart’s  presence.
6    Finally, 
Franklin  used  two  univariate  and  one  multivariate  ordinary  least  squares  models  to 
conclude that a negative relationship exists between median household income and Wal-
Mart’s  market  share  and  that  a  positive  relationship  exists  between  the  time  since 
entering a MSA and Wal-Mart’s market share.
7 
Franklin’s  work  begins  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  Wal-Mart  on  retail  grocery 
concentration, but three key differences exist between Franklin’s work and this research.  
First, Franklin’s data are expanded from 19 MSAs to contiguous grocery marketing areas 
(GMAs) containing both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.  Second, by drawing 
upon additional theory, additional explanatory variables are added to evaluate the effects 
of de novo entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters on the change in retail grocery concentration.  
Third, the empirical model gives econometric coefficients specifically describing how 
both existing operation of and new entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters affects changes in 
retail grocery concentration.  A discussion of the theory and empirical works used to 
develop our model follows.  
Location Theory 
Location theory explains the geographical concentration of firms on the basis of 
competition  and  economic  efficiency.
8    Location  theory  brings  together  three  related 
strands  of  literature,  neo-classical  theory  (NCT),  new  trade  theory  (NTT)  and  new 
economic  geography  (NEG).    In  NCT,  location  determinants  are  technological 
                                                       
6 Two variables were used in the multivariate logit model; median household income and total MSA population.  A 
univariate logit model was used to evaluate the effect of total MSA population on Wal-Mart presence, but the result 
was insignificant. 
7 Three variables were used in the multivariate OLS model; median household income, total MSA population, and time 
since Wal-Mart entry into the MSA. 
8  Geographical  concentration  is  defined  as  the  number  of  firms  within  a  defined  geographic  area,  not  as  the 
concentration of market share (Krugman, 1980).   8 
differences,  natural  resource  endowments,  and  factor  endowments  and  intensities 
(Brulhart, 1998).  In NTT, additional determinants of location include the degree of plant-
level increasing returns and the size of the home market, and NEG extends the first two 
strands by adding externalities and additional trade costs measures as determinants.   
The economic benefits described by location theory do not necessarily mean that 
locating  next  to  a  competitor  is  advantageous.    Economic  theory  would  suggest  that 
competition  exists  when  two  parties  compete  for  the  same  set  of  resources  and  that 
additional  room  for  entry  exists  in  a  growing  market.    Therefore,  heterogeneity  in 
founding rates, not low failure rates, maybe the drivers of agglomeration (Sorenson and 
Audia,  2000).    This  is  important  when  explaining  changes  in  retailing  and  localized 
markets. 
Empirical Manufacturing Concentration Studies 
Concentration  studies  from  the  manufacturing  sector  include  several  variables 
common to agglomeration and location theory.  In general, early concentration studies 
often  examined  the  determinants  of  concentration  levels,  but  more  recent  studies 
recognize the importance of explaining the drivers of change in market concentration.  
Therefore, change in retail concentration is most often used as the dependent variable 
(Curry and George, 1983).   
Curry  and  George  (1983)  identified  variables  that  predicted  change  in  market 
concentration  in  seventeen  studies  between  1960  and  1980.    Table  1  compares  the 
variables identified by Curry and George with the variables important to agglomeration 
and location theory.  In the manufacturing concentration and concentration-price studies, 
initial concentration and industry growth were identified as the most important variables   9 
influencing concentration, which is consistent with agglomeration and location theory.  
An important variable in the concentration research not present in the agglomeration and 
location theory is the concept of entry barriers, which is often difficult to measure (Curry 
and George, 1983).  Entry barriers are certainly important to manufacturing industries, 
but are less important to retailing because it is more difficult for retailers to hold excess 
capacity and easier for retailers to enter markets because of their typically lower fixed 
cost structure. 
Table 1: Key Independent Variables for Location and Concentration Analyses 
Variable  Location Theory  Manufacturing Concentration  
Initial Concentration / 
Beginning location 
density 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977  Curry and George, 1983; Rogers, 
2001; Connor et al., 1996 
Initial market size   Krugman, 1980, 1981  Curry and George, 1983; Rogers, 
2000; Connor et al., 1996 
Market growth  Hannan and Freeman, 1977  Curry and George, 1983; Levy, 
1985; Connor et al., 1996 
Trade costs  Fujita, Krugman, and 
Venables, 1999 
 
Proximity to Resources  Brulhart, 1998; Harris, 1954   
Change in Number of 
Firms 
  Curry and George, 1983; Rogers, 
2001 
 
SPECIFICATION AND DATA 
Past works evaluated in the literature review were the basis for specifying a model 
to determine the effects of de novo entry by Wal-Mart supercenter stores on retail grocery 
concentration.  Variables included in our models include those variables used in previous 
studies,  and  variables  that  tie  directly  back  to  agglomeration  and  location  theory.  
Therefore, the following model was specified.     10 
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where: 
4 CR ∆ i,t-(t-1) is the change in four firm concentration (CR4) in GMA i from t – 1 to  
t. 
CR4i,t-1 is the initial concentration level in year t-1 and GMA i. 
CPi,t-1 is the initial count of stores operated by the top two firms in year t-1 and  
GMA i. 
CP ∆ i,t-(t-1) is the change in the count of stores operated by the top two firms in  
GMA i, between t and t – 1. 
Yeari is a dummy variable for each year t = 1999, 2000, 2001. 
Pind i,t-1  is percent of total grocery stores classified as independent in year t-1 and  
GMA i. 
DCi,t-1 is the total number of grocery distribution centers in year t – 1 and GMA i. 
Pdni,t-1 is the initial population density in GMA i. 
Pdn ∆ i,t-(t-1) is the change in population density in GMA i, between t and t – 1. 
Log(Salesi,t-1) is the total grocery sales in year t-1 and GMA i. 
WM ∆ i,t-(t-1) is the change in number of Wal-Mart Supercenters in GMA i from t-1  
to t. 
WMi,t-1 is the initial count of Wal-Mart Supercenter stores in GMA i. 
Five years of data from 32 grocery marketing areas were available and collected 
from Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook and Market Scope (2000 – 2004).  The   11 
spatial  unit  is  a  grocery  marketing  area  (GMA),  defined  and  monitored  by  Trade 
Dimensions  on  the  basis  of  distribution  center  locations,  transportation  flows,  and 
physical  boundaries.    Over  time,  GMA  boundaries  change  because  grocery  retailing 
changes.    The  geographical  size  of  each  of  the  50  GMAs  vary,  but  most  are 
approximately  the  size  of  an  average  U.S.  state.    Although  GMAs  follow  county 
boundaries, they do not follow state boundaries.   
Of the fifty total GMAs, seventeen East and West coast GMAs underwent some 
type of boundary change between 1999 and 2003.  In addition, the “Fargo GMA” data 
contained inconsistencies, so it was excluded from the data set.  Therefore, 32 of the fifty 
GMAs had usable data for the years 1999 through 2003.  Figure 1 shows the GMAs used 
in the dataset (shaded areas).  Earlier data were not available because Trade Dimensions 
Marketing  Guidebook  did  not  publish  GMA  level  market  share  data  for  all  retailers 
before 1999.  After annual changes were calculated, four years of observations remained 
for each of the 32 GMAs.   
Possible implications from omitting the East and West coast GMAs should be 
discussed.  First, the omitted GMAs are among the most populated areas of the U.S.  
Therefore, the GMAs included in the data set are on average more rural and might not 
representative a sample of the U.S.  Second, the coastal GMAs have a lower CR4 level.  
Third, Wal-Mart operates fewer stores in the coastal GMAs, on average.  Combined, the 
three implications of omitting the East and West coast GMAs may mean that this sample 
of GMAs does not geographically representative the entire U.S.  But, even if the sample 
does not represent all of the omitted coastal GMAs, it represents parts of the more rural 
areas of the coasts such as parts of Virginia, New York, Maine, Vermont, Oregon, and   12 
Washington. The sample also represents the majority of the U.S. land area and is useful 
to  understand  the  effects  of  Wal-Mart  Supercenters  on  retail  grocery  concentration, 
especially in the areas where most Wal-Mart Supercenters are located.   
 
 
Figure 1: GMAs Included in the Dataset 
The sample of 32 GMAs had an  average CR4 level of 59.8,  and the  average 
change in CR4 was 1.1 from 1999 to 2003 (Table 2).  The GMAs had an average of 18.8 
initial Wal-Mart Supercenters, ranging from 0 in the Detroit GMA to 41 in the Tampa 
GMA, and, on average, 4.3 new Wal-Mart Supercenters were added to each GMA over 
the four years.  The standard deviation of the change in Wal-Mart Supercenters was high; 
3.9.  The change in the number of Wal-Mart Supercenters ranged from zero in the Detroit 
GMA to eighteen in Memphis GMA.     13 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Grocery Industry, 1999 to 2003 
 
Grocery 
Sales  CR4  ∆ CR4  Pop. Density 
∆ Pop. 
Density 
Mean   $9.0M   59.8  1.1  151.1  2.2 
St. Dev.  3570478  13.1  2.8  168.3  8.4 
 
# Wal-Mart  
∆  
Wal-Mart 
# Top 2 
Competitors 
∆ Top 2 
Competitors   
Mean  18.8  4.3  18.8  4.3   
St. Dev.  17.1  3.9  17.1  3.9   
Source:  Trade Dimensions Marketing Guidebook and Market Scope 
 
 
When  Wal-Mart  Supercenters  enter,  competitors  can  respond  by  opening  new 
stores to compete, by exiting and closing stores, or by doing nothing.   The count of 
stores  operated  by  the  top  two  firms  and  the  change  in  the  count  of  the  top  two 
competitors were added to the model to describe the competitor reaction to Wal-Mart’s 
entry.  Annually, the top two competitors in each GMA open 4.3 new stores, on average 
(Table 2).  This may suggest that competitors are either opening new stores or merging to 
as a reaction to Wal-Mart’s entry. 
Figure 2 shows the GMAs with the 50
th to 90
th percentile level of concentration in 
gray and 90
th to 100
th percentile of concentration in black.  Visually, one can see that 
parts of Florida, Texas, and Arizona are the most concentrated areas, while concentration 
levels are mixed through the rest of the study area.  Similarly, Figure 3 shows the change 
in concentration for the GMAs by percentile.  Note that many of the white GMAs in 
Figure 2.2 (<50
th percentile of CR4) are gray or black in Figure 3, showing that lesser 
concentrated GMAs are experiencing the greatest increases in concentration. 
 
 

























Figure 3:  Percentile Map of ∆CR4 by GMA 
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MODEL AND RESULTS 
The four years of data for the 32 GMAs were stacked to form a panel (a cross-
section of observations over time) of 128 total observations.  The panel has both a spatial 
dimension (GMAs) and a temporal (years) dimension.  Two types of models used to 
evaluate panel data are fixed and random effects models, which Greene (2000) describes 
in detail.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is inappropriate because it assumes identical 
coefficients across every GMA in the sample.  In the fixed effects model, slopes are 
constant  and  intercepts  vary  either  by  the  cross-section  (GMA),  time,  or  both.    To 
determine whether statistically significant differences exist across groups (e.g., GMAs), a 
F test is used to test for R
2 change.  A paired t test between a reference point (usually first 
or last year) and the test value can be used to test for temporal effects.  A random effects 
model is a regression with a random constant term or a mean value plus a random error.  
In  a  random  effects  model,  some  omitted  variables  may  be  constant  over  time  and 
varying among GMAs while others are fixed between cases but varying over time.   
The Hausman specification test is used to determine whether the fixed or random 
effects model is most appropriate.  If there is significant correlation between unobserved 
random effects and the regressors, the fixed effects model will be best because it allows 
for correlation between the independent variables and unobserved effect.  If, however, 
there is no significant correlation between unobserved random effects and the regressors, 
the random effects model would be more powerful because time-constant factors can be 
included.  In addition, the models will be tested for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
using the Breusch-Pagan test and a test developed by Woodridge (2002), respectively. 
   16 
Empirical Results 
The  panel  data  were  run  in  both  fixed  and  random  effect  models,  and  the 
Hausman test resulted in a P-value of 0.000.  Therefore, the fixed effects model, which 
allows for correlation between the independent variables and unobserved effects, was 
used for the results shown in Table 3.  The Breusch-Pagan and Woodridge (2002) tests 
found no causes of inefficiency from heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation.  The F test 
shows that the fixed effect is the result of significantly statistical different GMAs.   
Table 3:  Results from the Fixed Effects Model on Change in Concentration 
Group variable (i): GMA        No. of observations =  128 
R
2  Within  =  0.4314       Number of groups =  32 
R
2  Between =  0.0404        sigma_u =  13.53 
R
2  Overall =  0.0282        sigma_e =  2.19 
Prob > F =  0.000        Rho (var. due to u_i)  0.97 
F(13,83) = 4.84 that all u_i=0; Prob > F = 0.000 
  Coeff.  Std Err  t  P > |t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
CR4  -0.5554  0.0958  -5.80  0.000  -0.746  -0.365 
CP  0.0261  0.0250  1.04  0.301  -0.024  0.076 
∆CP  0.0431  0.0216  2.00  0.049  0.000  0.086 
Y99  0.4477  1.1238  0.40  0.691  -1.788  2.683 
Y00  -0.0082  0.8389  -0.01  0.992  -1.677  1.660 
Y01  -0.9314  0.6500  -1.43  0.156  -2.224  0.361 
PIND  -9.5768  6.5008  -1.47  0.144  -22.507  3.353 
DC  0.0228  0.4088  0.06  0.956  -0.790  0.836 
PDN  -0.0689  0.0453  -1.52  0.132  -0.159  0.021 
CPDN  -0.0080  0.0527  -0.15  0.880  -0.113  0.097 
LnSALES  4.5939  4.6311  0.99  0.324  -4.617  13.805 
WM  0.1343  0.0616  2.18  0.032  0.012  0.257 
∆Wal  0.1621  0.0899  1.80  0.075  -0.017  0.341 
F test that all u_i=0;  F(13,83) = 4.84  Prob > F = 0.000 
   17 
Four  variables  (CR4,  WM,  ∆WM,  and  ∆CP)  had  statistically  significant 
relationship with the change in CR4.  The result from CR4 (the beginning level of CR4) 
was significant at the 1 percent level with a negative sign, as expected.  In this study and 
in past manufacturing market concentration studies, higher initial market concentration 
means  future  changes  in  market  concentration  are  smaller.    This  describes  how  the 
market is converging to a new, higher level of concentration.   
Wal-Mart has a significant positive affect on the change in CR4, with the initial 
number of Wal-Mart supercenter stores (WM) variable significant at the 5 percent level 
and the change in the number of Wal-Mart Supercenter stores (∆WM) variable significant 
at the 10 percent level.  The WM coefficient was 0.1343, which, by itself, shows that the 
existing operation of an individual Wal-Mart Supercenter has a relatively small affect on 
the rate of market concentration change.  However, Wal-Mart operates multiple stores in 
geographical  areas  which,  combined,  have  a  significant  affect  on  the  rate  of  market 
concentration  change.    For  example,  on  average  about  19  Wal-Mart  Supercenters 
operated in each GMA annually, meaning the typical GMA would expect an increase in 
the  change  in  CR4  of  about  2.5  points  annually  due  to  the  presence  of  Wal-Mart 
Supercenters (Table 4). 
The coefficient for the change in the number of Wal-Mart Supercenters (∆WM) is 
0.1621.    Annually,  about  4  new  Wal-Mart  Supercenters  entered  the  average  GMA.  
Therefore, the average GMA experienced an increase in change in concentration of about 
0.69  points  due  to  Wal-Mart  Supercenter  expansion  (Table  4).    Individual  GMAs 
experienced  a  greater  expansion  of  Wal-Mart  Supercenters.    For  example,  in  the 
Memphis GMA, the average annual effect of entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters was 2.19    18 
Table 4:  Effect of Wal-Mart and Competitor son Average Annual ∆CR4 (1999-2003) 


























Mart Effect        
(WM + 
∆WM) 
Albuquerque  48.6  1.18  -0.34  3.32  0.53  3.85 
Atlanta  63.1  2.00  0.86  2.65  0.73  3.38 
Billings  62.6  -0.18  -0.11  0.40  0.32  0.73 
Chicago  61.7  -1.80  0.02  1.18  0.16  1.34 
Cincinnati  58.9  0.83  -0.01  2.05  0.77  2.82 
Cleveland  42.5  2.43  -0.26  0.97  0.16  1.14 
Dallas  54.6  1.40  0.71  7.66  1.70  9.36 
Denver  77.8  0.60  0.32  2.25  0.97  3.22 
Des Moines  68.5  1.20  0.05  1.78  0.85  2.63 
Detroit  51.3  3.20  0.03  0.10  0.08  0.18 
Grand Rapids  39.5  2.83  0.08  0.20  0.45  0.65 
Houston  62.7  1.28  0.29  2.75  1.46  4.21 
Indianapolis  56.4  3.18  0.33  2.85  0.81  3.66 
Jacksonville  75.4  -0.08  0.25  2.59  0.49  3.07 
Kansas City  46.1  2.13  0.10  3.73  0.81  4.54 
Louisville  66.2  1.68  0.05  2.42  0.65  3.07 
Memphis  54.9  0.18  -0.16  8.76  2.19  10.95 
Miami  88.2  -0.60  0.13  0.57  0.24  0.81 
Milwaukee  32.4  -0.80  0.09  0.87  0.69  1.56 
Minneapolis  43.3  -0.58  0.13  0.20  0.28  0.49 
Nashville   53.4  1.98  -0.16  5.88  0.85  6.73 
New Orleans  53.4  2.43  -0.58  3.89  0.45  4.34 
Oklahoma  41.8  2.98  -0.25  4.53  1.05  5.59 
Omaha  42.9  1.53  0.19  0.94  0.32  1.26 
Phoenix  69.6  2.85  0.40  0.91  0.61  1.51 
Salt Lake City  57.7  -0.33  0.00  0.97  1.09  2.07 
San Antonio  79.8  1.50  0.14  3.19  0.77  3.96 
Seattle  65.3  -0.60  0.44  0.03  0.12  0.16 
Spokane  57.6  -1.50  0.12  0.13  0.20  0.34 
Springfield  47.4  3.68  0.05  4.30  0.57  4.86 
St. Louis  49.7  1.25  -0.09  4.73  0.73  5.46 
Tampa   83.6  -0.13  0.33  4.13  1.09  5.22 
Average  58.0  1.11  0.10  2.53  0.69  3.22 
 
points, a high number considering that the mean change in concentration was only 1.11 
points.     19 
Finally, the change in the count of stores operated by the top two firms in each 
GMA (∆CP) was negative and significant at the 5 percent level.  Whether the top two 
competitors are expanding and merging due to Wal-Mart or not, their expansion and 
mergers are increasing the annual change in CR4 by 0.10 units, on average.  The Atlanta 
GMA experienced the greatest average annual change in concentration due to ∆CP (0.86 
units), while the average annual change in concentration in New Orleans fell by 0.58 
units due to ∆CP. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 The  effects  of  de  novo  entry  by  Wal-Mart  supercenters  on  retail  grocery 
concentration were evaluated for 32 relatively large GMAs, covering most of the United 
States.    The  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  Wal-Mart  is  increasing  retail  grocery 
concentration.  Existing Wal-Mart stores increased the change in concentration by 0.1343 
points per store and entry by new Wal-Mart Supercenters further increased the change in 
concentration by 0.1621 points per store.    In our sample, the regression results show the 
combined effects of existing Wal-Mart Supercenters and entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters 
increased  concentration  from  0.16  points  in  the  Seattle  GMA  to  10.95  points  in  the 
Memphis GMA (Table 4). 
Wal-Mart is on-target to open 370 new supercenters in 2006 and “plans to open 
more than 1,500 stores in the United States in the coming years (Associated Press, 2006).  
If the new 2006 stores are equally distributed between the 50 GMAs, each GMA would 
experience  an  increase  in  the  change  in  CR4  of  more  than  1  point.    However,  the 
distribution of the new supercenters will likely not be equal across all GMAs.  Wal-Mart 
will likely open 20 or more new supercenters in some GMAs, and none or few in other   20 
GMAs.  The 2006 store openings are few compared to Wal-Mart’s future expansion plans 
of opening an average of 30 new stores in each GMA.  Therefore, with Wal-Mart’s future 
current expansion plans, the combined effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters will continue to 
increase retail grocery concentration levels, especially in geographical areas targeted by 
Wal-Mart for expansion.  Even without factoring in competitor response, Wal-Mart will 
likely increase concentration by 10 points or more in some areas.     
This study evaluates the effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters on concentration at the 
GMA level.  However, retail grocery markets are much smaller Trade Dimension’s 
GMAs.  Within certain local markets, the effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters on grocery 
concentration could be much greater; especially true in small, rural towns.  In order to 
understand the effects of entry by Wal-Mart Supercenters on grocery markets, future 
research should reduce the spatial scale of this study from the GMA level to a county or 
zip code level.   By reducing the spatial scale, spatial effects could be incorporated into 
the modeling, and the effects of Wal-Mart could be evaluated separately between rural 
and urban areas.  Finally, this study could be extended as additional years of data are 
published by Trade Dimensions.  Additional years of data could be used to evaluate 
whether Wal-Mart is beginning to saturate any markets or whether any lag effects exist 
between Wal-Mart Supercenter entry and concentration changes.  In addition, addition 
years of data could be used to better understand the effects of entry by Wal-Mart on 
competitors.  
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